Research in Classics

Summer Issue (Apr.–Jun.)

No.2 (Overall No. 9), 2026

Editor-in-Chief: Liu Xiaofeng

Executive Editor-in-Chief: He Fangying

Social Sciences Academic Press (China), April 25, 2026

Table of Contents

　　Essays

　　Kalos and Eros in Xenophon's Symposium / Peng Lei  

　　How to Understand "Philosophy as a Practice of Death" / Wei Minghan  

　　Aristotle's Function Argument and Civic Virtue / Zhang Xiao  

　　A Justification of Eclecticism: Cicero in the Transition of Antiquity and Modernity / Cheng Zhimin  

　　Ontology in Embryo: al-Fārābī's Kitāb al-Ḥurūf Revisited / Cai Zhenyu  

　　Unpacking the Subtleties of the Chapter "The Dao Is Not Far from Humanity" in The Doctrine of the Mean / Tian Feng  

　　A Study of the Well-Field System in Mencius from the Perspective of Confucian Classics / Yi Hongxi  

　　Mencius's Substituting a Sheep for an Ox and Zhuangzi's Ox-Carving Knife / Zhao Yufan  

　　On the Transformation from "Subordinate Sacrifices to the Hundred Deities" to "Offering with Devoted Singleness" / Huang Yongqi  

　　Translations 

　　Edward Gibbon: une historiographie des Barbares / Yves Charles Zarka  

　　Die vielen Tode des Sokrates: Zum Schicksal einer Figur der abrahamitischen Religionskulturen / Sasha Dehghani  

　　Book Reviews

　　Rune Nyord's Yearning for Immortality: The European Invention of the Ancient Egyptian Afterlife / Dong Fenfang

　　Abstracts  

(Academic editors: Zhang Peijun, Guo Xiao)

Abstracts

Kalos and Eros in Xenophon's Symposium

Peng Lei

(School of Liberal Arts, Renmin University of China)

　　Abstract: In Xenophon's Symposium, the guests cover a wide range of topics over the banquet, yet discussions of beauty and eros run through the entire work and constitute its central theme. Despite their differences in wealth, wisdom, and erotic desire, all the symposiasts are men unenthusiastic about ruling and devoid of political eros.

　　Critobulus prides himself on his beauty and praises eros for physical beauty as directing human beings toward virtue, yet he displays a striking lack of moderation. He further claims that his physical beauty arouses erotic desire more effectively than Socrates' wise words, thereby foreshadowing a contest between bodily beauty and the wisdom of the soul. In response to Critobulus, Socrates distinguishes kisses, which represent bodily eros, from soul friendship free of erotic passion, and holds that the latter alone is worthy of honor—a distinction that becomes the theme of his subsequent speech.

　　Socrates prides himself on possessing the art of procuring, enabling women or men to please those they wish to be with. He compares the procurer who pleases.a single person with the one who pleases many or even an entire city-state, while deliberately glossing over the political divisions among those present. Yet Socrates himself has no political eros whatsoever, content with private erotic relationships forged through wisdom. He teaches the art of procuring to Antisthenes and urges him to serve the cities, though he himself refuses to employ this art for the city. As Antisthenes' friend, he is content to let Antisthenes arrange for him a certain love with another person.

　　In the beauty contest with Socrates, Critobulus argues that beauty consists in utility, in satisfying human needs well. Precisely by this standard, Socrates judges himself more beautiful than Critobulus, yet this judgment is rejected by a vote; equating beauty with the good or the useful runs largely counter to common sense. Socrates implies that wisdom is beauty, and only the one who knows "what beauty is" is truly beautiful.

　　In his long speech on eros, Socrates teaches that eros for the soul is superior to eros for the body, and that the lover must practice virtue and cultivate his character and conduct. Socrates thus exhorts Callias to care genuinely for virtue, to engage in the affairs of the city, to move from private eros toward political eros, and to pursue a more glorious reputation.

　　The Symposium contains both Socrates' teaching on political eros and a revelation of Socrates' own distinctive beauty and eros. Socrates loves souls of good nature, and he is beautiful by virtue of his wisdom.

　　Key words: Xenophon; Symposium; kalos; eros; Socrates

How to Understand "Philosophy as a Practice of Death"

Wei Minghan

(Institute of Philosophy, University of Bern)

　　Abstract: In the Phaedo, Plato famously characterizes philosophy as a "practice of death," one of the most influential yet controversial formulations in his work. While this claim has long prompted reflection on death and the significance of human life, its precise meaning intended by Plato remains a matter of considerable scholarly debate. Contemporary interpretations largely converge on two dominant approaches. The first, often labeled the ascetic interpretation,understands the practice of death as requiring withdrawal from bodily pleasures and an ascetic way of life. The second, the cognitive interpretation, construes it as a matter of evaluative or epistemic detachment, according to which one need not avoid the objects of desire, but should refrain from endorsing them as real and valuable. This article critically examines both interpretations and argues that neither adequately captures the philosophical significance of "practicing death" in the Phaedo. The ascetic reading overemphasizes behavioral avoidance and reduces philosophical life to a form of external discipline, while failing to account for the soul's internal capacities to resist and transform desire. The cognitive reading, although more attentive to the role of rational evaluation, misinterprets Plato's notion of "separation" by treating it primarily as a matter of correct judgment, thereby overlooking attentional orientation and the soul's activity by itself alone.

　　Through a close analysis of key passages in the Phaedo, this article proposes an alternative, allegorical reading of "death". Rather than referring to literal death or merely to a stance toward bodily desire, "death" here—closely linked to the invisible realm—designates, on my analysis, the soul's attentiveness to invisible beings. On this view, the practice of death concerns, in the first instance, not about how the soul treats the body, but about the soul's own activity. It consists in collecting the soul from the different parts of the body and concentrating it within itself. In cognition, the soul should withdraw from perception and desire and turn to rational contemplation of stable and invisible objects. This inward reorientation enables the soul to achieve a state of relative independence from bodily influences. Importantly, such independence is not secured through asceticism, but through the occupation of the soul by rational reasoning. By continuously directing attention toward intelligible objects, the soul becomes less susceptible to the persuasive force of pleasure and pain, thereby cultivating a form of immunity to desire. In this sense, the practice of death is best understood as a discipline of self-concentration and continuous rational contemplation rather than as either ascetic withdrawal or purely evaluative detachment from desire, thereby illuminating Plato's conception of the philosophical life.

　　Key words: practicing death; separation of soul and body; Socrates; Plato; ethics

Aristotle's Function Argument and Civic Virtue

Zhang Xiao

(Boya College, Sun Yat-Sen University)

　　Abstract: Aristotle's function argument in the Nicomachean Ethics provides the theoretical foundation for his account of civic virtue in the Politics, yet the two works exhibit a significant conceptual shift. In Nicomachean Ethics 1.7, the analogies of eye, hand, and foot—though largely overlooked in scholarly discussions of the ethical function argument—become theoretically salient in the Politics, particularly in Aristotle's analysis of the differentiated virtues of citizens, men, and women. These bodily analogies presuppose a part–whole relationship that finds its proper application in political theory, where citizens are understood as parts of the political community in a manner analogous to organs of a living body.

　　Within the political context, virtue is no longer understood merely as the excellent exercise of an individual's rational capacity, but as the successful performance of a function assigned by a larger whole, whether the polis or the household. A part–whole framework governs Aristotle's political theory, wherein an individual's virtue is determined by their position and designated role within the political community. This framework gives rise to the distinction between the good man and the good citizen, whose virtues may coincide only under specific constitutional arrangements, such as in a polity where citizens rule and are ruled in turn. The functional approach to virtue further illuminates Aristotle's treatment of rulers and subjects, gender roles, and the conditions for political stability. In discussing the differences between male and female virtues, Aristotle explicitly grounds them in the distinct functions assigned to each within the household and the polis: men are tasked with acquiring resources, women with preserving them, and their respective virtues of courage and temperance are calibrated accordingly.

　　While the Nicomachean Ethics focuses on the highest good achievable by human nature and identifies happiness with virtuous activity in accordance with the best and most complete virtue, the Politics reinterprets virtue from the perspective of the common good and political function. This does not imply a contradiction between the two works, but rather a complementary division of labor: the ethics investigates what it means for a human being as such to flourish, while the politics examines how individuals with different natural capacities and social roles can contribute to and participate in the good life of the community. The function argument thus serves not only to ground Aristotle's conception of human happiness, but also to provide a theoretical framework for understanding the differentiation of virtues in political life. This interpretation helps resolve long-standing puzzles about the relationship between the good man and the good citizen, and sheds light on Aristotle's distinctive approach to integrating ethical and political philosophy.

　　Key words: function argument; Politics; good citizen; civic virtue

A Justification of Eclecticism

Cicero in the Transition of Antiquity and Modernity

Cheng Zhimin

(School of Humanities of Hainan University)

　　Abstract: Cicero is worthy of the Chinese saying: "To establish the heart for Heaven and Earth, to secure the livelihood for the people, to carry on the lost teachings of past sages, and to open up lasting peace for all generations." His life's work in philosophy, rhetoric, and law indeed laid the foundational stones upon which the vast edifice of Western thought was later built. Yet, for the past two centuries, his reputation has suffered a profound and unjust devaluation. This decline is not due to any failing in his own work, but rather a symptom of a peculiar malady afflicting modern thought: a superstitious reverence for "originality". This modern obsession demands that a true thinker must cast aside all predecessors, ignore the accumulated wisdom of classical texts, and deduce a complete and self-sufficient system of thought from an absolutely certain, self-originating starting point, following only the strictest logical rules. However, this modern notion of "originality" is, in essence, a philosophical farce, an act of intellectual narcissism, a form of self-defication (egophany) where the thinker, in a vacuum, mistakes his own untutored reflections for universal truth. It ignores the simple fact that all human thought is a dialogue with the past. The very term "eclecticism" (ἐκλεκτός) originally means "to select" or "to choose the best". Far from being a passive or slavish compilation, true eclecticism is the active and discerning art of gathering the strongest insights from various schools and masters, using the teachings of the greatest sages as a guiding light, with the ultimate goal of approaching truth. Eclecticism is the very process by which genuine innovation is achieved. It is the proper or righteous path of intellectual creation—the path of synthesis, digestion, and eventual transcendence. Cicero stands as the supreme model of this eclectic ideal. He was a man who had no single, permanent master but learned from them all. He wandered through the halls of the Platonic Academy, creating a grand synthesis of the entirety of Hellenistic philosophical thought. He refused to pledge allegiance to any one sect, nor did he seek to hawk a private doctrine of his own invention. Instead, he practiced the art of selective judgment, choosing what was excellent, refining it, and re-articulating it with his own distinctive Roman clarity and eloquence. In this process of comprehensive synthesis, he did not merely transmit Greek culture; he transformed it, forging a new intellectual tradition that would educate Rome and provide the very bedrock for the moral and political vocabulary of Western civilization. For centuries, this eclectic method was held as the ideal of philosophical pursuit, precisely because it was understood that genuine creation is built upon a deep and critical engagement with the legacy of the past. In this truest sense, eclecticism was, and remains, the most profound form of originality.

　　Key words: Cicero; eclecticism; originality; egophany; sages

Ontology in Embryo: al-Fārābī's Kitāb al-Ḥurūf Revisited

Cai Zhenyu

(Department of Philosophy, Peking University)

　　Abstract: Al-Fārābī is typically regarded as the most original political philosopher in the classical Arabic philosophical tradition, a reputation often overshadowing his significance as a metaphysician. Since the  12th century, however, he has been perceived as a defender of Aristotelian metaphysics within Islam—an image still shaping contemporary scholarly assessments. Was al-Fārābī merely an interpreter of Aristotle? This article revisits his Kitāb al-Ḥurūf (The Book of Letters), particularly the chapter on the existent (al-mawjūd), reassessing his metaphysical thought through his theory of the meaning of existence.

　　The first section examines al-Fārābī's interpretation of the everyday Arabic understanding of al-mawjūd. He notes that for ordinary Arabs, the term derives from the verb "to find", illustrating this through the experience of searching for lost objects. This reveals a tripartite structure of self-thing-world in everyday experience: the existent is understood as what appears in the world, serving as the measure of the self's intention toward things.

　　The second section addresses al-Fārābī's clarification of the theoretical meanings of the existent. In theoretical contexts, he identifies two primary senses: (1) things with essence existing outside the soul, and (2) the true. Following Nicholas Rescher, Stephen Menn has developed the dominant interpretation that al- Fārābī strictly separates everyday and theoretical contexts, with these two senses corresponding to first-order and second-order concepts of existence respectively.

　　Against this reading, this article argues that al-Fārābī does not advocate a rupture between contexts. Rather, theoretical understanding represents a stricter form of everyday understanding. Al-Fārābī preserves both aspects of the everyday meaning: the being-in-the-world aspect becomes being external, while the being-the-measurement- of-intention aspect becomes being true. Furthermore, contrary to Menn's interpretation of externality as first-order and truth as second-order concepts, al-Fārābī does not employ a Frege-Russell distinction. For al-Fārābī, both being external and being true are predications of things themselves, differing only in their conditions.

　　The final section clarifies al-Fārābī's fundamental divergence from Aristotle through his treatment of the problem of becoming. Beneath his apparent adherence to Aristotelian solutions, al-Fārābī radically reshapes the fourfold Aristotelian senses of being. He extracts externality from Arabic everyday understanding as the primary meaning of existence, preserving the sense of being true while denying its primacy. The remaining Aristotelian senses (potentiality/actuality, being per se, and accidental being) are repositioned as modes ofthis primary externality. Thus, al-Fārābī's ontology represents a creative synthesis of Arabic everyday understanding and Aristotelian frameworks, inaugurating what may be called a Greco-Arabic ontological approach.

　　Key words: al-Fārābī; Book of Letters (Kitāb al-Ḥurūf); The Existent (al- mawjūd); theory of the meanings of existence

Unpacking the Subtleties of the Chapter "The Dao Is Not Far from Humanity"in The Doctrine of the Mean

Tian Feng

(School of Philosophy, Zhengzhou University)

　　Abstract: "The way of loyalty and reciprocity"（忠恕之道） is not a meta- ethical rule or moral norm, but rather a dynamic process of mutual adjustment between the self and others amid differences in identity, standpoint, and situation. Through this practice, profound human relational emotions are cultivated, leading to the attainment of humane virtue（仁德）, and it serves a balancing function in the practice and moral cultivation of ritual systems（礼制）. The chapter "The Dao is Not Far from Humanity" in The Doctrine of the Mean provides rich dimensions for understanding "the way of loyalty and reciprocity": within the "Fourfold Way of the Noble Person"（君子之道四）, the subject intuitively perceives the ethical demands of others and analogically applies them to oneself through identity exchange, thereby adjusting mutual expectations and responsibilities and cultivating deep emotions. Both loyalty and reciprocity are indispensable, and neither holds absolute foundational significance.

　　The "self"（己）is the aspiration for one's own potential within the horizon of relational identity, and it can only be fulfilled by extending outward through relationships with others. The "other"（人）is a network of relational meaning that extends outward from the closest, most interdependent individuals. The act of extending care from the "self" to the "other" is reciprocity（恕）, while the act of returning from the "other" to the "self" to achieve self-fulfillment is loyalty（忠）. The distinction between loyalty and reciprocity lies merely in the two facets of a reciprocal movement. Although loyalty and reciprocity can be distinguished as different directions, in action they are actually an integrated whole, mutually generating and complementing each other.

　　"Using an axe handle to carve another axe handle"（执柯以伐柯）is a practical imitation of a model. The phrase "gazing sidelong at it, one still deems it distant"（睨而视之，犹以为远）during the carving process stems from the inevitable misalignment and reciprocal dynamism between understanding and action. This is not an error to be eliminated but rather the inherent nature of ethical practice. The premise of "loyalty and reciprocity" is not value consensus but the innate goodwill of human beings. In the context of primary family relationships, it possesses a more innate legitimacy than the suspicion or fear of a "state of nature". As long as society continues to regard the family as the basic unit of ethical existence, and as long as human beings retain their capacity for empathetic resonance（感通）and compassion（恻隐）toward "the other", there remains a constant need to return to the "way of loyalty and reciprocity".

　　Key words: golden rule; the way of loyalty and reciprocity; virtue ethics; The Doctrine of the Mean

A Study of the Well-Field System in Mencius from the Perspective of Confucian Classics

Yi Hongxi

(Institute of Chinese Classics, Nanchang University)

　　Abstract: The well-field system, a land institution described in Confucian classics, holds profound civilizational significance. While land inherently sustains life, fields are cultivated through human labor, and the demarcation of boundaries in the well-field system integrates them into a structured civilizational order. The well-field system, as articulated by Mencius and New-Text Confucianism stipulates that eight families share one well-field and cultivate the public field together. At the center lies a 100-mu public field, comprising 80 mu for collective cultivation and 20 mu reserved for cottages. Each of the eight families cultivates 100 mu of private land, arranged around the central public field. "Eight families sharing wells" is a kind of group life. "Jointly cultivating the public field" embodies the public consciousness. The two concepts of group living and public awareness are the foundation upon which civilized order is built. The design of the well-field system embodies the foundational concept of civilizational order. Thus, it serves as its structural basis. Paying the tithe and establishing the division of labor in society are specific ways to establish civilized order. In the well-field system, the tithe provides the necessary material foundation for establishing civilized order. Granting land to the common people for cultivation and providing salaries to monarchs, ministers, bureaucrats and scholars, establish a division of labor within the community of civilizations. For the common people, participation in political life takes the form of cultivating allotted land, a practice institutionalized under the well-field system. This form of participation constitutes a distinct mode of labor division within the broader civilizational order, complementing the political and religious roles of the social elite. The well-field system, as a classical and enduring ideal, is not necessarily a perfect system to be implemented in reality. Instead, it serves as a yardstick for measuring history and reality. By examining the land system in history through it, we can understand history to some extent. In the process of transitioning from the well-field system to the Mingtian system, the disappearance of links such as joint cultivation of public land, the well-field division of land, and the 10% tax rate gradually lead to the disappearance of the civilizational significance borne by the well-field system, and the withdrawal of the populace from active participation in national politics. Meanwhile, the division of labor within the civilized community transformed into an opposition between the ruling class and the ruled class, and the classical Confucian vision of governance gradually disappeared.

　　Key words: Mencius; well-field system; New-Text Confucianism; civilized order; division of labor

Mencius's Substituting a Sheep for an Ox and Zhuangzi's Ox-Carving Knife

Zhao Yufan

(School of Philosophy, Fudan University)

　　Abstract: The figure of Butcher Ding in the Zhuangzi is conventionally interpreted as a master who, through his extraordinary skill in butchering an ox, imparts wisdom on navigating the world with ease and nurturing life. This reading assumes a coherent transmission of Daoist principles from butcher to lord, as well as from the particular skill of carving to the universal art of living.

　　This paper challenges this prevailing interpretation by arguing that the allegory of "Butcher Ding Carving the Ox" is fundamentally ironic. By examining the narrative's literary elements, including the characters, settings, and dramatic tension, this paper reveals a deliberate subversion of the very idea of a teachable "secret" to life. In the first part, the analysis begins by juxtaposing this allegory with the Confucian "ox" in the Mencius, highlighting how the butcher's public and artistic slaughter of an animal that Mencius sought to spare creates a stark ethical provocation. Meanwhile, Butcher Ding himself is portrayed as a parody of the Confucian ideal gentleman. This depiction, however, is undercut by his lowly profession, creating a sustained ironic dissonance that mocks the solemnity of sagehood and the notion of a universally applicable model for self-cultivation.

　　In the second part, this paper extends this ironic reading to the subsequent three parables in the "Essentials for Nurturing Life" chapter. The parable of one-footed official mirrors and mocks Mencius's tendency to attribute political setbacks to "Heaven", framing such appeals as a performative rhetoric that masks embarrassment. The wild pheasant's arduous search for food subverts the romanticized image of the recluse, exposing the harsh reality of labor within the ruler's domain and critiquing the illusion of autonomy within a politicized landscape. Finally, the scene of Lao Dan's funeral inverts a similar funeral story in the Mencius, and repurposes the concept of "release from inversion" to suggest that doctrinal comfort may itself be a form of suspension.

　　To conclude, this paper highlights that the "Essentials for Nurturing Life" chapter is not only a guide to individual self-cultivation or spiritual practice; rather, it wields a negative force that critiques various forms of normative construction. The moment Lord Wenhui perceives the secret of nurturing life amidst the bloody dismemberment of an ox becomes a darkly comedic revelation: any perfect theory for nourishing life may itself be a descending butcher's knife.

　　Key words: Zhuangzi; Mencius; Butcher Ding; allegory; irony

On the Transformation from "Subordinate Sacrifices to the Hundred Deities" to "Offering with Devoted Singleness"

Huang Yongqi

(Department of Philosophy, Capital Normal University)

　　Abstract: The Record of Ritual（《礼记》）contains numerous accounts of the "Great Recompense to Heaven"（大报天）. Commentators such as Zheng Xuan and Kong Yingda interpreted this as the "Subordinate Sacrifices to the Hundred Deities"（百神从祀） , which entails the collective worship of the heavenly host during the sacrifice to Heaven. The ontological essence of this approach lies in utilizing ritual to replicate the complete manifestation and operation of Heaven（天）, achieving "Resonance between Heaven and Humanity"（天人感通）through the indirect method of "Manifesting the Substance through its Function"（即用显体）. Kong Yingda maintained that since the Substance（体）of Heaven is formless, humanity can only resonate with it through its functional phenomena. By constructing a transformative microcosm within the ritual space, the ceremony aimed to synchronize with the macrocosm. This model prioritized political functionality, utilizing configurations such as the "Lordship of the Sun and Accompaniment of the Moon"（主日配月）to manifest the sanctity of imperial rule. However, historical evolution led the "Subordinate Sacrifices to the Hundred Deities" into the predicament of irreverence and chaos in ceremonial procedures. In response, Neo-Confucian thinkers such as Zhang Zai and Zhu Xi launched a vigorous critique, arguing that the "Subordinate Sacrifices to the Hundred Deities" violated the "sincere and reverent heart"（诚敬）of the officiant. These scholars emphasized the cosmological significance of the cultivation of the heart-mind and nature. They posited that the metaphysical correspondence between the "Heavenly Principle"（天理）and "Nature"（性）demonstrates that Heaven manifests its Substance directly within the human heart-mind（心）. In contrast with the indirect "Manifesting the Substance through its Function", Neo-Confucians asserted that the inner state of"Devoted Singleness"（精一）is the true key to resonance. Consequently, sacrificial rituals had to be centered on "Abiding in Reverence"（主敬）to achieve a direct communion described as "Facing the Presence of the Lord on High"（对越上帝）.  Following this trajectory, scholars such as Yang Fu, Chen Hao, and Qin Huitian executed a systematic reorganization of sacrifcial elements. Regarding objects of sacrifice, they compressed the "Subordinate Sacrifices to the Hundred Deities" into the "Sun and Moon" to maintain the limit of"Devoted Singleness". In reinterpreting the "Purified Burnt Offering"（禋祀）, they rejected Zheng Xuan's theory of "rising smoke"（烟祀）, redefining it as a "Purified Offering"（精洁致祭）reflecting internal sincerity. Regarding the altar, they upheld the principle that "Supreme Reverence requires no Altar"（至敬不坛，扫地而祭）, advocating for the "Sacrifice by Sweeping the Ground"（扫地而祭）to return to primal simplicity. Under this paradigm, the sacrifice to Heaven was integrated with the Neo- Confucian "Practice of Cultivation"（修养 工夫）, shifting focus from external completeness to the internal cultivation of the officiant's virtue.

　　Key words: Sacrifice to Heaven; Neo-Confucianism; Reverence; Zheng Xuan